Reflect upon a situation that you have either participated or observed in which leaders of different interest or stakeholder groups were trying to solve a complex problem while preserving their core interests. Who had what kind of power in this negotiation? How did they use it? Was hidden or invisible power at all at play in the way the issues were addressed or resolved? What was the nature of that hidden or invisible power? At the end, how did you feel about both the process and the outcome? What did you like? What may have bothered you?

(Note: This reflection paper was written in the first quarter of 2019 as part of an Ethics and Leadership course)

The system of government in Kenya was devolved in 2010. Devolution is a variant of decentralization where partial executive powers are delegated to sub-national units. Prior to this time Kenya operated a centralized system of government with the seat of power and authority in Nairobi. Previous attempts to decentralize the government were unsuccessful. However, the 2010 decentralization structure was backed up by the constitution to give it legitimacy and ensure a commitment to devolution. Forty-seven counties were created and sub-national level executive, legislative, and judiciary arms set up. It was expected that devolution would lead to even development as governance and resources moved closer to the people and help prevent conflicts such as occurred during the 2007/2008 Kenya post-electoral violence.

The 2010 constitution is the paramount source of visible power in post-devolution Kenya. The devolution was incorporated in the constitution to minimize the risk of the reversal of devolution, which occurred in prior devolution processes. The constitution contained mandates for the national and county governments. It also contained the mandates for the Chapter XV commissions, commissions that were set up for the smooth transitioning and operation of devolution. The chapter IV commissions included the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA), and the Ethics and Anti-corruption commission among others. With these mandates clearly stated, the various government and para-government agencies were clear on their roles and the resources available to them to fulfil those responsibilities. The constitution also makes possible a system of checks between various government agencies and between the agencies and the citizens of Kenya.

However, the system of revenue allocation to the counties is fraught with challenges. The national government is of the opinion the counties should not be saddled with so much responsibilities and by extension control over financial resources until it has found its feet or proven itself to be up to the task. The county governments retort that if they do not have access to commensurate resources and some financial autonomy how does the national government expect them to find their feet or fulfil their mandate to their constituents. While the national government and counties both have visible power, the power of the sub-national (county) government was limited by the hidden power still wielded by the national government. Tension arose within the system and two schools of thoughts emerged; the pro-centre and the pro-county proponents. These discussions are still on-going. The general atmosphere adopted is that a strong centre is still needed in a Kenya that is still prone to fragmentation. Pro-county actors maintain that this reasoning counters the spirit of devolution. The decision-making power of the chapter XV commissions is also limited in situations where enforcement of their proposals lies with the executive or the courts.

Also, hidden power is largely exercised by the powerful political elites, dominated by the Kikuyu tribe. Although some Kikuyu tribes have become fragmented due to the county delineation process, counties that are predominantly Kikuyu are still more powerful than other counties due to the colonial legacy of political and economic power wielded by that tribe. Hidden power is also exercised by the Office of the Auditor-General. This office is responsible for the disbursement of budgetary allocations to the national and county governments. There are, however, slight variations in the timing of when funds are disbursed to various governments. The Office of the Auditor-General says funds are disbursed based on the last audited accounts which county governments delay in preparing. Hence, they are unable to get funds allocated to them before the financial year is over. However, I think it is possible for the Office of the Auditor-General to use its power to set strict targets for the auditing of accounts, put in place needed incentives or disincentives so that counties can prepare and present their audited accounts and receive budgetary allocations for the year for which the budgetary allocation is intended. This is a source of concern for revenue allocation in Kenya because if funds are not disbursed on time, projects stall and when funds are finally released the gap in the proposal and execution could lead to loss of accountability, the ability to follow the money or the funds could be misappropriated.

Furthermore, civil society actors in Kenya mention that more powerful and elite members of the community often hijack grassroots public participation forums. These are forums where members of the county/sub-county are expected to jointly decide on projects priorities and evaluate project implementation for on-going projects. The civil society space is also limited in Kenya because most Civil Society Organizations do not want to be labelled as anti-government or associated with terrorism.

Citizens of Kenya are aware of the constitutional provisions regarding devolution in Kenya and use this as a basis of demands for good governance and accountability in revenue allocation from the national to the county governments and allocation from counties to communities. However, pervading corruption in Kenya creates a situation of powerlessness and the devolution process in Kenya has been defined as the devolution of corruption — a situation where corrupt officials moved from the national level to the counties but remain inherently corrupt. The consolation for some is that the pool of politicians eating the cake has widened and there is an increased chance that someday someone one knows might be at the table and it would be “our turn to eat”. We can only hope that this passive acceptance of corruption in the status quo does not erupt into violence in the future.

The revenue allocation outcome in Kenya is far from perfect. It remains an on-going process where the power structures keep shifting. The Commission on Revenue Allocation serves the needs of most marginalized communities by providing social services, so they can become at par with other communities. There are other success stories, but not without their criticisms. It remains a source of concern for me that despite the constitutional legitimacy and visible power the people and the county governments have, the hidden and invisible power still sets the agenda and the same discussions and arguments keep reinventing themselves.